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Studies using functional neuroimaging and patient populations
have demonstrated that distinct brain regions subserve semantic
knowledge for different classes of inanimate objects (e.g., tools,
musical instruments, and houses). What this work has yet to
consider, however, is how conceptual knowledge about people
may be organized in the brain. In particular, is there a distinct
functional neuroanatomy associated with person knowledge? By
using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
we measured neural activity while participants made semantic
judgments about people or objects. A unique pattern of brain
activity was associated with person judgments and included brain
regions previously implicated in other aspects of social-cognitive
functioning: medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal cortex,
intraparietal sulcus, and fusiform gyrus. These regions were gen-
erally marked by relatively little change from baseline brain activ-
ity for person judgments along with significant deactivations for
object judgments. Together, these findings support the notion that
person knowledge may be functionally dissociable from other
classes of semantic knowledge within the brain.
Among the most intriguing findings in cognitive neuroscienceis that different categories or classes of objects are often
associated with distinct neuroanatomical regions. Both neuro-
psychological and functional neuroimaging research have con-
verged on the observation that perception of, and semantic
knowledge about, particular classes of inanimate stimuli (e.g.,
tools, musical instruments, and houses) are subserved by distinct
areas of the human brain (1–8). Although the exact basis of this
neuroanatomical localization remains open to debate, most
researchers concur that the brain contains some kind of cate-
gory-specific neural architecture. Indeed, this observation has
prompted some theorists to suggest that the mind may have
evolved dedicated neural circuits to deal with knowledge per-
taining to certain categories of objects; specifically, objects that
have biological relevance or significance to people (e.g., con-
specifics, tools, and plants) (4). The benefits of such a modular
system reside in the rapid and relatively error-free manner in
which semantic knowledge can be selected and deployed. Were
distinct classes of information to share a similar neuroanatomical
location, interitem competition might compromise (e.g., slow
down) the selection process.
In the current experiment, we examined the neural substrates
of a class of semantic knowledge that earlier work on category
specificity has largely ignored, namely, other people. Although
neural regions that subserve the perception of persons (e.g., body
parts and faces) have been characterized (9–16), research has yet
to investigate how the brain represents general knowledge about
the internal, unobservable attributes of social agents. Person
knowledge differs from knowledge about inanimate objects in a
number of potentially important respects. Most obviously, the
attributes used to describe persons differ substantially from
those used to describe inanimate objects. Whereas a person may
be described as anxious or devious, inanimate objects rarely
engender such a description. One basic feature of person knowl-
edge is that it frequently refers to the mental states of others,
states that cannot be directly observed but may instead require
generalization from one’s own internal psychological properties
(i.e., theory of mind). Finally, the application of person knowl-
edge demands a flexibility that is typically unnecessary for most
classes of object knowledge (e.g., people must frequently track
interactions among independent agents acting in complex social
settings).
To the extent that: (i) conspecifics are arguably the most
important stimulus class to humans; and (ii) person knowledge
differs in several important ways from semantic knowledge
about inanimate objects, we expect the representation of person
knowledge in the human brain to conform to the category-
specific neural organization observed in object semantics. To this
end, we used event-related functional MRI (fMRI) to test the
prediction that the brain represents person knowledge in a
distinct manner from knowledge about inanimate objects.
Adopting a paradigm from related research on the organization
of semantic memory, the current experiment compared the brain
activity associated with semantic judgments about people with
that associated with comparable judgments about inanimate
objects.
Materials and Methods
Fourteen paid volunteers from the Dartmouth College commu-
nity (7 male and 7 female; age range, 18–27) participated in this
experiment. All participants were right-handed, native English
speakers with no history of neurological problems. All gave
informed consent according to the procedures approved by the
Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at Dartmouth
College. Data from one female participant were discarded
because of problems with the acquisition of images during the
functional scans.
Imaging Procedure. Imaging was conducted by using a 1.5-tesla
GE Signa scanner. An Apple Powerbook G3 computer running
PSYSCOPE V.1.2.5 (17) controlled stimulus presentation and re-
corded participants’ behavioral responses by means of a keypress
interfaced with a PSYSCOPE button box (Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity, Pittsburgh). Stimuli were projected onto a screen at the
end of the magnet bore that participants viewed by way of a
mirror mounted on the head coil. A pillow and foam cushions
were placed within the head coil to minimize head movements.
We first collected a high-resolution T1-weighted structural
scan (SPGR) followed by four functional runs of 250 axial scans
(20 slices; 5 mm thick; 1 mm skip). Functional images were
collected by using a gradient spin-echo echo-planar pulse se-
quence (repetition time  2,000 ms; echo time  35 ms; flip
angle  90°, 3.75  3.75 in-plane resolution). The duration of
each functional run was 8 min and 20 s.
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Behavioral Procedure. Participants responded to visually pre-
sented noun–adjective pairs (4,000 ms duration) by pressing one
of two response buttons if the adjective could ever be true of the
noun (left forefinger) or another button if it could not (right
forefinger). Nouns were the name of a person (e.g., David,
Emily) or an object from the categories clothing (e.g., glove, shirt)
and fruit (e.g., grape, mango). Half of the adjectives could
appropriately describe a person (e.g., assertive, energetic, fickle,
nervous) but not any of the objects, whereas the remaining half
of the adjectives could describe one class of objects, but not
persons or the other class of objects (e.g., clothing: patched,
threadbare; fruit: sundried, seedless). To ensure that participants
made use of general semantic knowledge about different classes
of targets, they were further instructed to decide the appropri-
ateness of the adjective for hypothetical exemplars of the noun
(e.g., for a hypothetical person named David, not an individual
they might know with that name). Each trial began with a fixation
cross presented for 250 ms. A target noun was then presented
alone for 1,000 ms (36-point New York font), after which an
adjective was also presented (36-point Helvetica font). The
noun–adjective pair remained onscreen for an additional 2,750
ms, during which the participant’s behavioral response was
recorded. Each fMRI run consisted of 50 trials in which the
adjective was appropriate to the noun and 50 trials in which it was
not. A pseudorandom order of trial types and a variable inter-
stimulus interval (250–6,000 ms) was used to optimize estima-
tion of the event-related fMRI response (18). During interstimu-
lus intervals, participants passively viewed a fixation crosshair,
which defined the baseline.
MRI Data Analysis. Preprocessing and statistical analysis of the
fMRI data were performed by using SPM99 software (Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology). To allow the magnetic
field to reach equilibrium, the first four time points (8 s) of each
functional run were discarded. Preprocessing included slice
timing and motion correction, normalization to the MN1305
stereotactic space (interpolating to 3-mm cubic voxels), and
spatial smoothing with an 8-mm Gaussian kernel. An automated
segmentation algorithm (Stanford University) identified gray
matter voxels from each participant’s T1-weighted anatomical
scan, and subsequent statistical modeling was restricted to these
voxels. Statistical analyses were performed by using the general
linear model in which the event-related design was modeled by
using a canonical hemodynamic response function and its tem-
poral derivative. Comparisons of interest were implemented as
linear contrasts. This analysis was performed individually for
each participant, and contrast images for each participant were
used in a second-level analysis treating participants as a random
effect. Peak coordinates were identified by using a statistical
criterion of at least 19 contiguous voxels exceeding a voxel-wise
threshold of P  0.001. A Monte Carlo simulation (www.wjh.
harvard.edu/slotnick/scripts.htm) of our brain volume demon-
strated that this cluster extent cutoff provided an experiment-
wise threshold of P  0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons.
Regions of interest (ROIs) were defined from clusters that
survived these thresholding criteria, and peristimulus hemody-
namic time courses were extracted for each of these ROIs on a
participant-by-participant basis (representing percent signal
change in each condition relative to the fixation baseline). One
sample, two-tailed t tests (random effects, threshold of P  0.01)
were used to test whether signal change at the time point
corresponding to the peak response differed significantly from
baseline in each region.
Results
Analysis of the reaction time data showed that participants made
semantic judgments about Persons significantly faster than com-
parable judgments about Objects [means, Ms: 900 ms vs. 1,019
ms, t(12)  3.92, P  0.002, r  0.49]. In addition, faster
responses were returned on ‘‘yes’’ than ‘‘no’’ trials [Ms: 870 ms
vs. 980 ms, t(12)  6.29, P  0.0001, r  0.67]; however, because
this response type factor did not impact on the fMRI data,
imaging analyses were collapsed across ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no’’ trials.
To examine whether judgments about persons and objects
were associated with different patterns of neural activity, we
compared the event-related BOLD (blood oxygen level-
dependent) signal associated with Person trials to that associated
with Object trials. This comparison yielded distinct patterns of
brain activity for each type of target. Object  Person compar-
isons (Table 1 and Fig. 1) demonstrated greater activity in left
inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG), left inferotemporal (IT) cortex,
left posterior parietal cortex, left superior frontal gyrus, and
bilateral insula cortex. LIFG modulation was observed in mul-
tiple regions extending the entire extent of the inferior frontal
gyrus. No significant activation differences were observed be-
tween fruits and items of clothing.
In sharp contrast, Person  Object comparisons (Table 2 and
Fig. 2) were associated with modulation in a very different set of
brain areas that included dorsal and ventral aspects of the medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC), right intra-parietal sulcus (IPS), right
fusiform gyrus (FuG), left superior temporal (ST) and medial
temporal (MT) cortex, left motor cortex, and regions of the
occipital cortex bilaterally.
To further investigate the neural response in regions modu-
lated by Object and Person judgments, we examined the hemo-
dynamic time course in each of the regions described above (Fig.
3). Beyond the observed neuroanatomical differences between
Object and Person judgments, these two sets of brain regions
were associated with qualitatively different hemodynamic re-
sponses. Whereas regions identified from Object  Person
comparisons uniformly produced signal changes above baseline
(Table 1 and Fig. 3 a and b), regions identified from Person 
Object comparisons were generally marked by nonsignificant or
modest changes from baseline in response to Person targets,
along with significant deactivations in response to Objects (Table
2 and Fig. 3 c and d). Indeed, the brain regions associated with
activations above baseline for Person trials were almost entirely
a subset of those demonstrating activations for Object trials,
except for some activations unique to Person trials in bilateral
basal ganglia, bilateral occipital lobe, and left cerebellum. In all
Table 1. Significant peak locations in Object > Person
Anatomic label x y z
t value
Object Person
R. insula 36 23 6 5.70† 3.20*
L. insula 33 24 6 6.42† 4.40†
L. inf. frontal gyrus 53 30 12 3.67* 1.34
50 19 27 4.80† 3.22*
50 41 2 3.65* 1.40
50 7 22 5.26† 3.15*
50 24 4 4.34† 1.64
48 8 36 4.11* 2.56
59 8 38 4.29* 3.41*
45 1 33 4.48† 3.04
L. inf. temporal 53 59 5 2.98 0.31
50 53 10 4.53† 2.18
L. post. parietal 30 67 50 5.00† 3.21*
L. sup. frontal gyrus 9 17 43 3.96* 2.88
Coordinates are from the Talairach and Tournoux atlas (49). Object and
Person columns display the t value associated with the area’s peak hemo-
dynamic response relative to passive baseline for Object and Person trials,
respectively; *, P  0.01; †, P  0.001; R, right; L, left; inf, inferior; post,
posterior; sup, superior.








cases, these unique Person trial activations were in voxels
adjacent to Object trial activations and appeared generally to be
serving the motoric and perceptual demands of the experimental
task.
Finally, because Person trials were associated with signifi-
cantly faster reaction times than Object trials, we conducted a
secondary analysis to rule out the possibility that time course
differences were spuriously produced by differences in the
relative difficulty of the Person and Object judgments. Specifi-
cally, for each functional scan we selected 20 Object trials and
then selected a subset of 20 Person trials matched to the Object
trials for reaction time. The resulting average reaction time for
Object trials (1,051 ms) was nearly identical to that for Person
trials (1,047 ms). We then reanalyzed the fMRI data by using
these trials and subsequently compared the peak signal change
for time courses associated with Person and Object trials in each
of the regions obtained in the primary analysis. Of the 17 peak
activations observed in Person  Object comparisons, only a
single region did not continue to demonstrate a significant
difference (P  0.05) after matching for time on task. This was
the left MT region centered at 66, 18, 15, which was only
marginally significant, P  0.11. Of the 14 peak activations
observed in Object  Person comparisons, all regions continued
to demonstrate a significant difference after matching for time
on task. Differences were particularly stable in MPFC (for
Person  Object) and LIFG (for Object  Person), where we
obtained a significance level of P  0.01 for all comparisons after
matching for time on task.
Discussion
The results of this experiment demonstrate a qualitative disso-
ciation between the brain areas subserving semantic judgments
about people and inanimate objects. This dissociation was
evidenced both by the neuroanatomical localization of different
brain areas modulated by Object and Person judgments (Figs. 1
and 2) as well as by qualitative differences in the nature of
the hemodynamic time courses underlying these modulations
(Fig. 3).
Neuroanatomically, Object  Person comparisons yielded
regions (LIFG, IT, and posterior parietal cortex) that were
highly consistent with earlier neuroimaging research on semantic
memory and object recognition. LIFG activation has consis-
tently been observed across a range of tasks that require use of
semantic knowledge, including object naming and categoriza-
tion, exemplar generation, abstractconcrete word decisions,
and tests of factual knowledge (19–22). In addition, activation in
the IT region was almost identical to that observed in a previous
study in which participants were required to make semantic
judgments about tools versus animals (8), and similar activations
throughout IT have been associated with a range of object
perceptionnaming tasks (5–7). Finally, earlier work has also
implicated posterior parietal cortex during the maintenance of
object information before a behavioral response (23) and during
tactile object recognition tasks (24).
In the same way, Person  Object comparisons identified
regions (dorsal and ventral MPFC, the IPS, the ST region, and
FuG) that converge with earlier work suggesting that these areas
participate in a range of social-cognitive tasks (25). For example,
a number of studies have observed modulation in dorsal MPFC
in tasks that require self-monitoring or the attribution of mental
states to others (26–28), as well as during retrieval of personally
relevant memories (29, 30). In addition, patient studies have
linked ventral MPFC to activities that involve the rapid, f lexible
use of social knowledge, such as gender stereotyping (31) and the
integration of emotion with thoughts and behavior (32–35).
Similarly, the IPS, ST, and FuG have consistently been linked to
the perception of socially relevant stimuli, such as eye gaze,
biological motion, body parts, and faces. For instance, several
recent studies have observed IPS modulation when people
assume the physical perspective of another individual (36) or
Fig. 1. Activation maps show brain areas to be more active during Object
trials than during Person trials. Regions of modulation included the left
inferior prefrontal cortex and the left IT cortex (a), as well as the left posterior
parietal and the left insula cortex (b). See Table 1 for the Talairach and
Tournoux (49) atlas coordinates.
Table 2. Significant peak locations in Person > Object
Anatomic label x y z
t value
Object Person
Dorsal MPFC 0 54 21 5.40† 1.36
Ventral MPFC 3 39 0 5.55† 3.41*
12 36 0 4.39† 2.81
R. fusiform 30 51 3 2.08 0.92
R. intraparietal sulcus 63 33 33 3.19* 0.89
60 33 21 3.67* 0.46
R. occipital 48 63 12 3.70* 1.64
L. sup. temporal 60 6 3 0.65 1.61
60 12 12 0.45 1.37
L. med. temporal 66 24 12 1.55 0.25
66 18 15 0.78 0.39
L. motor 45 27 63 1.57 2.22
30 39 60 0.41 1.49
33 36 69 1.12 1.71
30 27 69 1.46 2.29
L. occipital 51 75 21 3.07* 0.80
15 99 21 2.10 0.96
Coordinates are from the Talairach and Tournoux atlas (49). Object and
Person columns display the t value associated with the area’s peak hemody-
namic response relative to a passive baseline for Object and Person trials,
respectively. Negative t values represent deactivations relative to baseline; *,
P  0.01; †, P  0.001; L, left; R, right; MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; sup,
superior; Ed, medial.
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perceive targets displaying direct eye gaze (15, 37), tasks that
have been linked to theory of mind and its associated cognitive
functions. Likewise, the ST region (the superior temporal sulcus
and adjacent areas of the superior and inferior temporal gyri)
has been shown to play an important role in the perception of
social stimuli, including head and mouth movements, changes in
eye gaze, body parts, and emotional expression (9–12). Finally,
the modulation we observed in FuG corresponds closely to a
region, dubbed the fusiform face area (FFA), that previous
research suggests is selectively responsive to perception of,
imagery for, and identification of faces (13–16, 38). We note that,
although participants never reported engaging in visual imagery
for the person trials, these IPS, ST, and FuG modulations may
nevertheless have been associated with participants’ spontane-
ous generation of mental images of body parts and faces.
Importantly, Object and Person trials were also associated
with qualitatively different hemodynamic time courses. Whereas
Object  Person modulations took the form of activations above
the baseline, modulations associated with Person  Object
comparisons were typically deactivations. More specifically,
these Person  Object modulations were produced by consistent
deactivations for Object trials along with nonsignificant or
modest modulations for Person trials. As such, these data raise
a question about how to interpret the observation that Person
judgments consistently produced little change from a passive
baseline condition.
One framework in which to consider these results originates in
the observation that, when at rest, some brain regions are
characterized by relatively high rates of metabolic activity (29,
39, 40). That is, the resting brain consistently assumes a preferred
configuration of metabolic activity, with some regions routinely
displaying higher levels of activity than others. Interestingly, of
the four neuroanatomical regions with notably high resting
metabolic rates, three were observed in the current study
for Person  Object comparisons: dorsal MPFC, ventral
MPFC, and lateral parietal areas that include the IPS (medial
parietalprecuneus regions constitute the fourth high-
metabolism region, which we did not observe across compari-
sons in this experiment).
Recently, Raichle and colleagues (28, 40, 41) have argued that
such tonically high metabolic rates may reflect high levels of
spontaneous mental processing that take place during rest. To
the extent that metabolic activity in a brain region corresponds
to the engagement of mental operations subserved by that
region, high metabolic rates suggest that some brain regions
engage in continuous, active processing during resting states.
Intriguingly, three of the four highest resting metabolic rates are
found in brain regions, dorsal and ventral MPFC and lateral
parietal cortex (including the IPS), that have consistently been
linked to social-cognitive processes such as the simulation of
other minds, the flexible use of social and moral knowledge,
self-referent memory, emotion regulation, and the perception of
socially relevant stimuli (15, 25–27, 30–37, 40, 43–48). Whereas
these studies have typically reported MPFC andor lateral
parietal increases, it is important to note that these increases have
consistently been observed relative to some other active task,
thereby obscuring whether any changes occur relative to a resting
baseline (see refs. 30, 40, and 47 for exceptions in MPFC). That
social thought and perception appear to be subserved by areas
with high resting metabolic rates suggests that social-cognitive
processes constitute an important component of the brain’s
resting state of activity.
Fig. 2. Activation maps show brain areas to be more active during Person trials than during Object trials. Regions of modulation included the left temporal
sulcus (a), the dorsal and ventral MPFC (b), the right FuG (c), and the right parietal temporal-occipital junction (d). See Table 2 for the Talairach and Tournoux
(49) atlas coordinates.








Because regions with high metabolic rates are actively engaged
during resting states (such as the passive fixation conditions that
often define the fMRI baseline), they consistently deactivate
across a range of active cognitive tasks (39). When obliged to
perform an active task, the brain typically suspends baseline
processes, producing deactivations in the regions subserving
those processes. However, because researchers have focused
almost exclusively on the functional significance of activations
above baseline, relatively little is known about the exact nature
of the default baseline processes taking place during rest. The
limits imposed by restricting interpretation to activations above
baseline suggests that a different analytic approach is required
when investigating a region associated with high resting meta-
bolic rate and consistent deactivations across tasks. Because such
regions are tonically engaged in the processes they subserve, they
are unlikely to produce activations above a resting baseline; one
may imagine a neural ceiling effect, of sorts. Instead, if a region
is known to deactivate during many active tasks, then identifying
conditions that produce no change from baseline can help to
characterize the kind of processing operations that may occur
spontaneously during rest. More specifically, if one experimental
condition produces the kind of deactivation typical for a partic-
ular region whereas a second condition produces little or no
deviation from baseline, one may tentatively conclude that the
processes uniquely engaged by the second task overlap (at least
in part) with the ongoing, default processes of that region.
The results of the current study demonstrate exactly such a
pattern in dorsal MPFC, ventral MPFC, and lateral parietal
regions. That is, Object trials produced significant deactivations
across all three of these regions, replicating the deactivations that
are consistently observed in these regions. In contrast, Person
trials did not significantly modulate activity in either dorsal
MPFC or lateral parietal cortexIPS and only modestly modu-
lated activity in ventral MPFC. Taken together, these two
characteristics of the observed MPFC and lateral parietal mod-
ulations suggest that the processes subserving semantic judg-
ments about social targets overlap considerably with default
processes engaged during resting baseline. By yielding a signif-
icant deactivation below baseline, ventral MPFC only partly
conformed to the idealized pattern of results. However, the
observation that Person judgments did not overlap considerably
with baseline ventral MPFC activity may not be terribly surpris-
ing. Whereas ventral MPFC has been linked to the use of social
knowledge in real time, its role in representing abstract social
knowledge seems to be minimal. Indeed, patients with ventral
MPFC lesions can usually articulate social traits and the norms
that govern social life, although they appear impaired at making
appropriate use of such explicit information in their everyday
life (31).
Fig. 3. The hemodynamic time courses in the left inferior prefrontal (a) and the left inferior temporal cortex (c) were characterized by activations above baseline
for Object trials (filled red squares) and either modest or nonsignificant activations for Person trials (open blue triangles). In contrast, the dorsal medial prefrontal
(b) and right lateral parietal cortices (d) were characterized by significant deactivations for Object trials, along with no significant modulations for Person trials,
a pattern typical for areas identified in Person  Object comparisons. Time courses were calculated by collapsing across multiple clusters within a neuroanatomical
region (except for the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, for which only one cluster was identified). The scale is seconds (one second per hash mark). Error bars
display the standard error of the mean.
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In summary, the results of the present investigation suggest
that distinct networks of brain regions subserve the representa-
tion of semantic knowledge about people and objects. Although
the areas participating in the representation of object knowledge
have been characterized extensively in both neuropsychological
and neuroimaging work, the current study is, to the best of our
knowledge, the first to identify a network of regions that
specifically subserve person knowledge. One interesting future
direction will be to disentangle whether person-sensitive regions
respond simply to the presence of socially relevant stimuli or
whether they subserve some specialized cognitive operations
brought to bear when thinking about people (e.g., representing
the internal states of other intentional agents). We speculate that
the semantic system for person knowledge may prove to rely on
a neural architecture structurally similar to that underlying
object knowledge: temporal areas such as the ST region and FuG
may subserve perception and identification of socially relevant
stimuli in the environment (as IT areas do for object perception),
whereas MPFC areas may represent more elaborative semantic
information about the descriptive characteristics or internal
mental states of social agents (akin to the role of LIFG in
nonsocial semantics). Person knowledge may also have a unique
contribution from the lateral parietalIPS region, which may
partly support theory of mind representations (15, 37). While
this initial study points out the functional neuroanatomical
dissociation between the systems supporting object and person
knowledge, continuing research guided by these hypotheses will
certainly be needed to characterize the nature of these systems
more fully.
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